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NEUTRALITY IN MODERN ARMED CONFLICTS: 
A SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPING LA'V':' 
by Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Williams, Jr. ** 
Neutrality may raise as many legal problems for states 
embracing it, as belligerency does .fo1· states at zmr. In 
this article the auth01·, a professo1' of /au• at the College of 
William and Mary, discusses some of these p1·oblems. In 
particular, he considers wlzethe1· states lzaz·e au unlimited 
right to be neutral tou.:m·d belligaents under the United 
Nations Charter. 
Traditionally, neutmlity u·as a matte1· of free choice 
for states, subject to any treaty obligations. There u•as no 
obligation in genaal to 1·emain neutml or to become a 
belligerent in the face of zcarlike actions of other states. 
In modern times, some scholars haz•e suggested that the 
United Nations Chm·ter and laze dez•eloped thereuncle1· 
*The opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School, the 
Department of the Army, or any other governmental agency. 
This article has previously been published in substantially similar form under the 
title, The Et•olution of the Notion of Neutrality in .\locierll .-\rmcci Collt1u:ts-
Additional Report, at 18 Revue de Droit Penal Militaire et de Droit de Ia Guerre 
159-90 (1978). Professor Williams' article was one of se,·eral in various languages 
published by the Ret·ue as part of a symposium on neutrality in armed conflict. 
The Raue, first published in 1962, is a publication of the International Society of 
Military Law and the Law of War, with offices at the Palais de Justice, Brussels, 
Belgiu~. The mailing address for both the Ret'IH' and the Society is: A.S.B.L. 
Seminaire de Droit penal militaire, Palais de Justice, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium. 
For several years the United States correspondent for the Society was Lieutenant 
Colonel James A. Burger, deputy staff judge advocate for the 8th Infantry Division, 
Bad Kreuznach, Germany, 1980 to present. He was assigned to the faculty of The 
Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, from 1975 to 1979. 
~~ JAGC, U.S. Army Reserve. l\lobilizatiun designee to Tlw Judge Ad\'vcate G~:n­
eral's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. Professor of Law, l\larshall-\\'ythl! School 
of Law. College of William and l\lary. Williamsburg, Virginia, 1977 to present. 
Associated with l\Iarshall-Wythe School of Law sincl' 1972. On acth·~: tluty in tn~: 
F.S. Army Judge Ach·ocate General's Corps. 1967-72. Assudate in the law firm of 
Sheppard, l\Iullin, Richter & Hampton. Los Angeles, California, 191}4-Uij. B.A., 
1958, :\LA., 1969, and LL.B., 1964. Cni\'ersity of Southern California: LL.l\1. 
1967. and J.S.D .• 1970, Yale University. l\lember of the Bar ~~r California. 
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have imposed on states an obligation to take sides against 
a state engaging in military aggression or other unlawful 
warlike activity. 
Professor Williams concludes that in fact the law of 
neutrality has not changed so drastically. Member states 
of the United Nations have a treaty obligation to carry 
out orders of the Security Council, but otherwise may 
remain neutral if they so desire. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the author uses the contextual method of problem 
solving though application of the goal-oriented decision 
theory developed and refined by Professors McDougal, 
Lasswell, and Reisman of Yale University, and other 
scholars. Readers of the Military Law Review were intro-
duced to this method and its specialized vocabulary in 
Professor Walker's book review at 83 Mil. L. Rev. 131 
(winter 1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The thesis of this article is that, in the context of rapidly changing 
technological, political and legal conditions in which modern armed 
conflicts have occurred, the traditional rules of neutrality have in 
practice altered substantially. However, any a priori conclusion 
that the entire corpus of traditional neutrality law no longer oper-
ates might well be erroneous. A careful, detailed analysis of the 
subject is required. This article assuredly does not present the 
necessary definitive analysis of the many legal issues involved. In-
stead, it offers an impressionistic exploratory inquiry into certain 
major issues, seeking to encourage the broad range of research re-
quired to develop definitive analysis useful both for governmental 
advisors and legal scholars. The observational perspective of the 
writer is that of a citizen of the world community recommending to 
decision-makers policies reflecting community aspirations and ap-
propriate outcomes of legal decisions calculated to implement those 
policies more effectively. 
The methodology 1 underlying this presentation has three aspects. 
The first is a requirement for comprehensive factual analysis of 
1 A concise discussion of the methodology used in this paper is presented in 
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, Theories Abont International Law: Prologue 
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any particular instance of armed conflict-an analysis that is con-
textual, viewing that conflict within the context of the existing 
global process of power in which states interact by various 
strategies to secure and maintain effective power positions in their 
relations. Next comes trend analysis of the course of decision on 
legal claims concerning neutrality-an analysis that, as regards 
past trends, properly considers the present and future effects of 
new conditions pertinent to the conduct of modern armed conflicts. 
Finally, there is need for policy-oriented analysis of trends of legal 
decision-an appraisal of trends in light of advocated world commu-
nity policies seeking the maximum international peace and security 
reasonably attainable in this troubled world. 
Only through application of such methodology may one expect to 
determine accurately present developments in the rules of neu-
trality, to project those developments into the future, and to ap-
praise the consequences of those developments. The traditional ap-
proach to neutrality was to create a model, the "status" of neu-
trality. That model subsumed, a priori, both an hypothesized view 
of uniform attitude and conduct of all neutrals in all international 
conflict situations, and a set of contentions as to legal outcomes of 
decision on claims pertaining to neutrality. In turn, as this model 
proved unsatisfactory when imposed upon the rich diversity of real-
ity, officials and scholars created still other models, represented by 
diverse terms, such as "differential neutrality" and "non-
belligerency", to describe gradations of attitude and conduct and 
contentions as to resulting changes in legal outcome. 2 
to a Coufiguratiue Jurispr11deuce, 8 Va. J. Int'l. L. 188 (1968), and in ~lcDougal, 
Jurisprudeucefor a Free Society, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1966). Detailed application of 
this approach is illustrated in McDougal and Feliciano, Law ami .\/i11i11111111 World 
Public Order: The Legal Regulatiou of Iuteruatioual Coercion (1961). European 
readers will find a discussion in .McDougal, luteruatioual Latt•, Potrer, and Pol· 
icy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 Hague Recueil des Cours 137 (1953). 
2 For discussion of one or more of these terms, see 2 Oppenheim, /uter11atiouai 
Law (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht 1952); Tucker, The Lau· of War a11d Neutrality at 
Sea (1957); Castrem, The Preseut Law of War aud Neutrality (1952); Greenspan, 
The .lfoderu Law of Laud Wa~(are (1959); Bowett, Se(f·Defeuse in luten1ational 
Law (1958); Kelsen, Priuciples of luteruatioual Law (2d ed., rev., Tucker 1967); 
Lawrence, The Principles of I uteruatioual Law (1895); Brownlie, International 
Law aud the Use of Force by States (1963); 11 Whiteman, Digest of luteruational 
Law (1968); VII Hackworth, Digest of luteruatioual Law (1943); 2 Wheaton'sln· 
teruatioual Law (A. Keith, £>d., 1944); Stone, Legal Controls of Juterllatiouai 
Couflict (1954); Komarnicki, The Place of Nwtrality in the .1foderu System of 
International Law, 80 Hague Recueil des Cours 395 (1952); Wilson, 'Nofl-
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The conflicting views 3 concerning the references of these terms, 
both factual and legal, obviously cast doubt on the value of the 
terms for policy and legal analysis. Also, legal literature tends to 
use the terms interchangeably.4 Yet, this babel of diverse, ambigu-
ous terminology continues in the legal literature. Attempting to 
work within the doctrinal confines of this diverse terminology is ar-
guably futile. Neither the fluid reality of state attitude and conduct, 
nor the multiple outcomes of legal decision on varied claims as to a 
neutral's rights and duties in various conflict situations, can accu-
rately be reflected in some frozen model, or series of models, repre-
sented by such terms. State officials may use such terms as crude 
indicators of attitude and conduct, with at least implied assertions 
of legality of their state's posture. However, the terminology ap-
pears useless as a departure point for legal analysis. In place of that 
approach, we recommend the methodology set forth above. 
II. THE PROCESS OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Although, in theory, a future armed conflict could occur in which 
all states participate directly by using military forces, the possibil-
ity is exceedingly remote, and would be a conflict in which the laws 
of neutrality are irrelevant. Thus, for this discussion, it is assumed 
that in any armed conflict certain states, varying in number, will 
wish not to participate by employing military forces. Indeed, envi-
sioning the normal conflict of the reasonably forseeable future to be 
quite limited in the number of combatant states, the author 
suggests that frequently the overwhelming majority of states will 
wish to be "neutral." 
This paper uses the term "neutral" merely to describe a state 
that is not an active fighting participant in the conflict. Likewise, 
here, the term "belligerent" merely describes a state that is em-
ploying its military forces in the conflict. State practice and scho-
Belligerency' in Relation to the Terminology of Neutrality, 30 American Joul'nnl 
of International Law 121 (1941); and Kunz, 1\'eutrality aud the Eu1·opcau Wnr 
1939-1940, 39 Michigan Law Review 179 (1941). 
a E.g .• as regards "non-belligerency", see Oppenheim, supm note 2, at 654 n.J, 
and Tucker, supra note 2, at 199 n.5. 
4 E.g., Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 649; Castren, supra note 2, at 450-51; Stone, 
supra note 2, at 365, 404. 
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larly literature have used these terms to refer to widely varied con-
duct and attitudes, as well as subsuming varied legal outcomes. In 
view of such confusing references, we might better depart from the 
use of such terms as "neutral" and "belligerent," as we increasingly 
have departed from use of the term "war." These terms unfortu-
nately continue to carry connotations both of law and fact existing in 
an earlier era, as well as twentieth century encrustations of com-
petitive claims of law and policy made by state officials and scho-
lars. As officials and scholars have moved to substitute the more 
factually descriptive term "armed conflict" for "war," we might well 
begin to use the terms "combatant" and "noncombatant state," or 
"fighting'' and "nonfighting state," to reduce the risk of confusing 
description of conduct with legal outcomes of decision regarding 
permissible acts of a state as described. 
To return to our discussion of the process of armed conflict, one 
should note that the nature of the legal claims as to the rights and 
duties of a neutral and of any of the belligerents will vary, depend-
ing upon the particular conflict. In large part, the appropriate appli-
cation of law and policy as to those claims likewise varies. Thus, in 
all instances, one must analyze the factual features of the particular 
conflict process out of which arise claims pertaining to the laws of 
neutrality. We suggest the following features of the conflict process 
as a check list for use in comprehensively appraising relevant fac-
tors: 
a. the relative power positions of the opposing sides in the con-
flict, and the relative power position of each belligerent side and of 
each neutral (or association of neutrals); 
b. the nature of past relationships of each belligerent and each 
neutral; 
c. the nature of the objectives for which each belligerent is em-
ploying military forces; 
d. the geographical extent of the conflict, both in terms of the use 
of military forces and of the consequences (political, economic, etc.) 
resulting from the conflict; 
e. the duration of the conflict; 
13 
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f. the "crisis" level-the level of expectation that a belligerent or 
neutral will suffer imminent, serious loss from the conflict unless it 
takes avoidance action; and 
g. the nature of the military weaponry employed, with emphasis 
on its range, accuracy, area of impact, and specialized destructive 
capabilities. In any particular conflict situation any or all of these 
features may play an important role in the attitude and conduct of 
each belligerent and of each neutral in their relations inte1· se, in the 
types of legal claims that either will raise, and in the outcome of 
legal decision on those claims. 
Any particular armed conflict occurs within the broader context 
of the global power process in which states seek to increase or main-
tain positions of power through the use of diplomatic, ideological, 
economic and military strategies. Contextual conditions that may 
influence conduct of belligerents and neutrals, the nature of claims 
about this conduct, and the outcomes of decision on those claims 
include: 
a. the continued, albeit somewhat muted global competition for 
power between the United States and the Soviet Union, now be-
come a triangular competition (in some regions) with inclusion of the 
People's Republic of China; 
b. the relationship of each belligerent and each neutral with other 
neutrals, raising questions of conflicting obligations and of the po-
tential for widened participation in the conflict or the triggering of 
new but related conflicts, and 
c. changing perspectives and practices in the conduct of armed 
conflict, e.g., mass mobilization of human and physical resources, 
elimination of the resource base of the opponent (economic warfare), 
and rapidly developing military technology increasingly emphasiz-
ing indirect, less discriminate modes of broad area destruction of 
life and property. 
III. BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES CONCERNING 
NEUTRALITY 
Outlined here are the general world community policies involved 
in considering claims pertaining to neutrality. In discussing the 
14 
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trends of decision on certain selected claims, we will specify policy 
in greater detail in appraising those trends and making recommen-
dations for future decision. 
In any modern international conflict, claims may refer to the 
question of whether a particular state is required by international 
law to participate in some manner in that conflict, i.e., to depart 
from what otherwise would be the requirements of the traditional 
laws of neutrality. This has to do with the question of each state's 
responsibility for supporting international public order. The over-
whelming bulk of the claims, however, will refer to various aspects 
of interaction of belligerent and neutral. In either situation of claim, 
the principal community policies involved in legal decision are: 
a. the widest necessary assumption of state responsibility to act 
for the world community in insuring that sufficient power is 
mobilized and used to overcome a belligerent that has resorted un-
lawfully to the use of armed force, and 
b. the achievement of objectives for which armed force is lawfully 
employed with the minimum necessary consumption or destruction 
of human and material resources. 
As to the policy of assumption of responsibility to maintain world 
public order, that policy may apply differently, depending. upon 
whether the organized community has or has not determined the 
lawfulness of the particular use of armed force. Where the United 
Nations Security Council or General Assembly (e.g., the latter act-
ing in appropriate circumstances under the "Uniting for Peace" 
Resolution 5 ) has characterized a belligerent's conduct as unlawful, 
the author urges that the principle of community responsibility is 
applicable. This is so regardless of whether any call upon states to 
take some specific action is viewed as a controlling decision or as a 
recommendation. In either event, the characterization of a bellige-
rent's conduct as unlawful would be authoritative, since it would be 
rendered on behalf of the world community under authority of the 
United Nations Charter.6 Pertinent to policy as to neutrality, com-
munity policy calls for the widest necessary participation in placing 
5 G.A. Res. 377, 5 C'.::\. GAOR, Supp. (::\o. ~ll) HI, l'.::\. Do<:. A 1775 !195liJ. 
6 :'lie Dougal and Feliciano. -~"ln·a note 1, at 410. 
15 
MILITARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
the required resources at the disposal of those acting on behalf of 
the community to apply sanctions against an unlawful belligerent. 
This obviously proposes discrimination in favor of and assistance to 
the belligerents acting for the community, and might take any form, 
from military activity to economic and other nonmilitary assistance. 
However, the policy of minimum consumption or destruction of 
resources also applies here. Necessarily, armed force will occasion-
ally be required to maintain public order in the world community, us 
in national communities. Yet, absent the extreme of all-
encompassing global conflict, all states need not, and should not, 
participate in a conflict situation. The United Nations Charter ex-
pressly recognizes the possibility that various Member States might 
remain neutral in the event of United Nations action to maintain 
public order. Article 48 states that, 
The action required to carry out the decision of the Secu-
rity Council for the maintenance of international peace 
and security shall be taken by all the Members of the 
United Nations or by some of them, as the Security 
Council may determine. 7 
A guiding principle of sanctioning strategy is to terminate an un-
lawful use of force promptly and economically-the principle of 
economy in the use of force. We refer not just to the waste resulting 
from consumption of resources by unnecessary state involvement in 
conflicts. More important, perhaps, is the danger of increased de-
struction due to spread of the conflict because of unnecessary par-
ticipation. Also, in certain instances, the concern for minimizing de-
struction will excuse a state from discrimination against an unlawful 
belligerent where that state is especially subject to destructive re-
taliation by an aggressor (e.g., a weak state bordering upon u much 
more powerful aggressor). 8 
Thus, the nature of participation by each state in community ac-
tion against an aggressor, or in other community use of force, 
should vary, depending on that state's capabilities; the require-
7 Emphasis added. 
8 See Komarnicki, supra note 2, at 479. 
16 
1980] LAW OF NEUTRALITY 
ments for assistance present in the particular situation (e.g., base 
facilities; rights of transit; provision of supplies, or perhaps, merely 
diplomatic support), and other factors. Perhaps in many instances 
the situation will not require from the great majority of states any 
conduct that departs from the standards set under the laws of neu-
trality. 
Neutrality may be useful to the world community in other re-
spects. The situation of "permanent or perpetual neutrality"9 of 
some states, such as that of Switzerland and Austria, may indeed be 
useful in the maintenance of public order. Generally, a state has 
accepted the obligation of permanent neutrality pursuant to an in-
ternational agreement wherein other states agree to protect the 
state's territory and independence. 10 The United Nations Charter 
does not refer explicitly to the question of admission of a perma-
nently neutralized State. At the 1945 San Francisco Conference on 
the drafting of the Charter, the view that permanent neutrality of a 
state would be incompatible with obligations under the Charter re-
ceived much support. 11 Nevertheless, Austria was admitted to the 
United Nations despite its announced policy of permanent neu-
trality. 
The permanent neutrality of a state appears to be acceptable 
under the United Nations Charter, if the Security Council agrees. 12 
As we discussed earlier, Article 48 of the Charter authorizes the 
Security Council to consider the special needs of certain states. 13 A 
permanently neutral state may by its location serve as a "security 
buffer'' between other states that fear attack from each other. Fur-
ther, the need for mediators, for channels of communication be-
tween opposing belligerents, for "Protecting Powers" under the 
1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of noncombatants, or 
9 Castr(m, supra note 2, at 449; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 661; Ogley, The 
Theory and Practice of Neutrality i11 the Tu·e11tieth Ce11t11ry 3 (1970). 
1°Black, et al;, Xeutralization a11d World Politics xi (1968). 
11 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 459-60. See Kelsen, The Lau· of the Uuited .\'atio11s 94 
(1951); Bowett, supra note 2, at 174. 
12 Verdross, Austria's Permanent Xeutrality aud the r'uitcci .\'atious Organi:a-
tiou, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 61, 67 (1956); Kunz, Austria's Perma11e11t .\'eutrality, 50 
Am J. Int'l. L. 418 (1956). 
13 Lalive, International Organizations and Ne11trality, 24 Brit. Y.B. lnt'l. L. 72, 
88 (1974). 
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for a location for negotiations, are but a few of the "infrastructure" 
supports assisting the cause of minimizing adverse affects of conflict 
and facilitating the restoration of public order that can be provided 
more easily by a permanently neutral state. 
Regardless of the question of requiring affirmative discriminatory 
support from states against an aggressor state or other state that is 
the target of community approved military sanctions, community 
policy requires that, at the minimum, neutral states should not ac-
tively hinder community efforts and should not actively aid the ag-
gressor. Even to that extent, community policy would suggest al-
tering traditional neutrality law, since under that law certain as-
sistance could be provided to a belligerent by a neutral, as long as 
the neutral offered it equally to all belligerents. 
The foregoing discussion has focused on the situation where the 
organized community has characterized the use of force by bellige-
rents as legal or illegal. From perspectives of community policy, 
what is the result if this has not occurred? On the one hand, one 
might argue that all states should be strictly impartial vis-a-vis the 
belligerents. Conflicting views could result from each state deciding 
for itself which side in the conflict lawfully is using force, and lead 
to broadened conflicts that might disrupt the still fragile United Na-
tions Organization. A similar argument could be made concerning 
"regional" neutrality in the settling of a conflict between members 
of a regional organization such as the Organization of American 
States or the Organization of Mrican Unity.) 
On the other hand, the firmly established recognition of the right 
of collective self-defense shows that the world community already 
authorizes third states not only to take discriminatory action as 
nonparticipants in a conflict, but even to launch military forces 
against an aggressor, on the basis of individual state characteriza-
tion of the lawfulness of each belligerent's use of force. This is so, 
albeit the state's characterization is provisional, and action is taken 
at its peril, since its conclusion is subject to the appraisal of other 
states, and possibly, to subsequent review by the United Nations 
Security Council or other agencies of the organized community. 
The community policy that supports direct military participation 
in collective self-defense, and discriminatory action by a neutral 
against the belligerent characterized by the neutral as the aggres-
sor, is the same-the common interest in maintaining international 
18 
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peace and security. Although individual characterization is more 
subject to abuse or error, the price of foreclosing a neutral state 
from engaging in discriminatory conduct on that basis is the sac-
rifice of perhaps essential assistance in maintaining public order. 
Ultimately, the question concerns the risks involved in decen-
tralized community action to maintain public order against chal-
lenges of unlawful use of force, versus the risks involved in permit-
ting successful uses of unlawful force, including the risk of re-
pudiating rules restraining the uses of force. These rules have been 
established only recently at the price of enormous human suffering 
and destruction of resources on a global scale. Further, it should be 
pointed out that in many instances of armed conflict the facts clearly 
will show the identity of the aggressor. Even if a situation of uncer-
tainty calls for initial suspension of judgment, the subsequent con-
duct of each belligerent, e.g., the nature of announced or implicit 
objectives; the proportionality of use of force; efforts to achieve 
earliest termination of the conflict and to resort to other means of 
resolving disputes, and acceptance of organized community efforts 
to achieve settlement, should serve to clarify "the identity of the ag-
gressor. 
If, indeed, there are instances of true uncertainty or of essentially 
equal fault, those exceptional cases would not justify policy fore-
closing individual state action in support of international law in all 
instances. Finally, we might also comment that past experience has 
not indicated such a massive "rush to judgment," as is envisioned by 
the argument calling for impartiality of states in the absence of or-
ganized community characterization. On the contrary, in many past 
situations clearly calling for support in maintaining international 
peace and security, we have seen a lamentable failure of such sup-
port, in that all too many states prefer noninvolvement at the risk of 
the defeat of community interests. 
IV. TRENDS OF DECISION ON SELECTED CLAIMS: 
APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. CLAIMS AS TO SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN 
THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC ORDER 
A major claim concerning the present development of the rules of 
neutrality in modern armed conflicts concerns whether, indeed, a 
19 
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state presently has the right to be impartial toward all belligerents 
in the conflict. Does modern customary international law, or the 
United Nations Charter, require states to discriminate against an 
unlawful belligerent? Any significant work of legal scholarship con-
siders this claim. 14 However, we note that these writings generally 
pass over the problem, implicitly assuming an affirmative response 
to the question whether, under traditional neutrality law, a state 
indeed had a right to be impartial. Scholarly literature seems to 
assume that was the case, and now directs attention to the question 
of whether a neutral now is under a duty of partiality. 
Proper assessment of the present trend of decision requires 
awareness that under traditional international law a state lawfully 
could resort to the use of force for whatever purpose it chose. A 
state permissibly could use force to defend itself or other states 
from prior armed attack, or otherwise to maintain its position of 
power, or to expand its power position at the expense, even the 
extinction, of other states. Since, in theory, any state lawfully could 
be the target of armed force, a state was allowed to be neutral at 
the sufferance of the belligerent states; permitted to be a nonpar-
ticipant in the conflict. Likewise, any state, even if the belligerents 
in a conflict were willing to allow it to be neutral, lawfully could 
choose to become a belligerent. 
Thus, neutrality was essentially contractual, albeit that "offer 
and acceptance" normally were most implicit in any instance of neu-
trality. Likewise, with freedom to force a neutral at any time to 
become a belligerent by attacking it, or with the freedom of a neu-
tral to become a belligerent at any time by entering its military 
forces in the conflict, 15 the specific conduct indulged in by any par-
ticular neutral vis-a-vis any particular belligerent might vary de-
pending upon the triangular power relationship of the opposing bel-
ligerent sides and of the neutral. Potentially, a broad range of con-
duct partial to one of the opposing belligerent sides was possible in 
this essentially contractual process of neutrality. That a substantial 
amount of uniformity of expectation developed in the nineteenth 
14 E.g., McDougal and Feliciano, 1m pm note 1; Oppenheim, 1111 pl"tl nott• 2; Tut·kl'l', 
supra note 2; Castr{m, supra note 2. 
15 Komarnicki, supra note 2, at 402; Orvik, The Derliue of Xculra/iiJI l!lll-1/lll 
at 28 (1971); Schwarzenberger, lulerualioual La11' as Applied b11 /ult·rullll!mal 
Courts aud Tribuuals: The LaU' of Armed Cou.f7irl 573 (1968). 
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century as to the generally appropriate range of conduct of neutral 
and belligerent in their relations was due to the fairly uniform fea-
tures of armed conflicts of that period: (a) quite limited objectives 
for the use of armed force; (b) the limited mobilization of resources; 
(c) the limited quantum of personal and equipment employed in ac-
tual combat; and (d) the limited extent and ambit of destruction re-
sulting from military strategies. 
Under traditional neutrality law, then, a neutral in reality had not 
the right, but the duty of impartiality (perhaps varying in extent in 
a particular conflict due to the actual process of interaction with 
opposing belligerents) that arose due to the implicit contractual 
basis of neutrality. This duty was the quid pro quo for the forbear-
ance of belligerents from forcing the neutral to become a belligerent 
by attacking it: "[t]he classical and positivist conception of neu-
trality which developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
was one of complete impartiality towards the parties to any conflict 
unless a treaty of alliance modified the position. The foundation of 
the doctrine of absolute neutrality was the absolute right of the 
state to resort to war."16 
The fact that under the traditional law of neutrality a neutral did 
not have the right to be impartial, but rather, had a duty of impar-
tiality, should serve to emphasize how significant would be the 
quantum leap in the development of international law if, today, one 
could conclude that under customary international law states are 
under the quite opposite duty of partiality against the belligerent 
who is the aggressor in an armed conflict. We should note that only 
in this century, in the lifetime of many now living, with the de-
velopment of the rule prohibiting use of armed force except for 
self-defense or other community authorized purposes, could one 
say that a state had, under general international law, a right to be a 
neutral, and further, a right to be as impartial as it pleased toward 
the belligerents. The use of armed force against a state not wishing 
to join or assist either side of a conflict would, under the general 
rule prohibiting use of force, be unlawful. Implicit in the statement 
that the rule against unauthorized use of force exists is the assump-
tion that, generally, a state unlawfully using force will be subject to 
effective sanctions, whether employed by centralized or decen-
16 Brownlie, supra note 2, at 402. See also Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 653; 
Tucker, supra note 2 at 204. 
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tralized community action. A state giving assistance to an aggressor 
likewise would be subject to proportionate sanctions. 
Thus, absent some additional fundamental change in international 
law, one could conclude that under customary international law each 
state today has a duty not to assist an agressor state, but also the 
right not to assist any belligerent. The question is whether the 
present trend of decision has moved beyond this point to reflect a 
still more intense development of community identifications and ex-
pectations premised on common interest, by establishing a duty of 
affirmative partiality-an obligation to provide affirmative assist-
ance to those belligerents combating an unlawful disrupter of public 
order. 
The present trend of decision is that, absent a controlling decision 
of the United Nations Security Council acting under Article 39 of 
the United Nations Charter, a state is under no duty to take a posi-
tion of affirmative partiality toward either belligerent side in a con-
flict. Other writers 17 have in detail presented the past trend of de-
cision starting with the Covenant of the League of Nations, then 
moving foward to the Pact of Paris of 1928 (the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact), the pre-World War II practice, the United Nations Charter, 
and subsequent state practice. We merely map out salient details 
here: 
1. Covenant of the League of Nations. 18 
Under the Covenant, each member was at most required not to 
hinder action by others in support of the Covenant, and not to pro-
vide assistance to a state that violated the Covenant. The League 
Council could determine whether there had been a prohibited resort 
to war (Article 10), but each member was free to decide whether 
circumstances required it to participate in the economic or other 
17 See, e.g., authorities cited at note 14, supra. 
18 See discussion of the Covenant and its effect on the laws of neutrality in 
McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 420-22; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 
645-46; Komarnicki, supra note 2, at 422; Graham, The E.ffect of the League of 
.Vatiou.~ Cot•enaut ou the Theory and Practice of Neutrality, 15 Calif. L. Rev. 357 
(1927); Kunz, The Covenant of the League of Nations and Neutrality, 29 Proc. 
Am. Soc. lnt'l. L. 36 (1935). 
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sanctions recommended by the Council under Article 16 of the Cov-
enant.19 Thus, a member was free both to be a neutral (nonparticip-
ant in use of force) and to be as impartial as it chose, regardless of 
the Council's decision. 20 In armed conflicts during the League's ex-
istence, 21 various members of the League declared neutrality and 
many agreements during the period provided for the possibility of 
neutrality in future conflicts. In the 1930's, with the acts of aggres-
sion by Italy, Japan and Germany, the expectations of League effec-
tiveness "declined steadily until the vanishing point was reached."22 
Many states claimed neutrality as the clouds of major war grew 
darker, or at the outbreak of World War II. 
2. Pact of Paris. 
Article 1 of the 1928 General Treaty for the Reuniciation of War 
as an Instrument of National Policy,23 generally known as the Pact 
of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, states: 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the 
names of their respective peoples that they condemn re-
course to war for the solution of international controver-
sies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in 
their relations with one another. 
The Pact does not refer to the concept of neutrality. 24 The Interna-
tional Law Association in its Budapest Articles of Interpretation 
19Kelsen, supra note 2, at 170 n.167. 
20 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 646. 
21 Examples include the 1921 war between Greece and Turkey, in which the Allied 
Powers issued a collective declaration of neutrality; the Chaco War between 
Paraguay and Bolivia, in which all neighboring states, who were League mem-
bers, declared their neutrality; and the Italian-Ethiopian War, in which Albania, 
Austria, and Hungary refused to agree with the Council's conclusion that Italy 
had violated the Covenant. 
22 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 423. 
23 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 
Aug. 27, 1938, 45 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
24 Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Artides of l11lerpretatiuu, 20 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 178 (1934); Brownlie, supra note 2, at 403. 
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adopted in 1934, considered that the Pact authorized the parties to 
act contrary to the duties of neutrals. 25 This view has been chal· 
lenged. For example, Castren maintained that the Pact of Paris 
"had no effect on the law of neutrality."26 The present writer does 
not concur. 
Assuredly, the parties to the Pact assumed no commitment to im· 
pose sanctions against one who violated the agreement. Therefore, 
neutrality in an armed conflict was permissible. 27 However, the 
Pact rejected the fundamental basis of the traditional law of neu· 
trality, "the unrestricted right of sovereign States to go to war." 28 
In establishing the bellum justum doctrine as a legal concept, 20 the 
Pact certainly expanded the permissible uses of coercion in response 
to unlawful use of force. Any party was authorized to determine if 
there had been a breach and to take action against the violator, 
whether as a belligerent or as a neutral taking some discriminatory 
action. 
United States officials relied on the competence of individual 
league members to employ sanctions for violations of the Pact while 
the United States was still a neutral in the early stages of World 
War II. Thus, the 1940 United Kingdom-United States "destroyers 
for bases" agreement30 and the passage of the 1941 Lend Lease 
Act 31 were justified as permissible discrimination for violation of 
the Pact: 
A system of international law which can impose no pen-
alty on a law breaker and also forbids other states to aid 
the victim would be self-defeating and should not help 
25 38 Int'l. L. Assn. Rep. 66-67 (1935). 
26 Castren, supra note 2, at 432. 
27 Kelsen, supra note 2, at 168; Tucker, supra note 2, at 168. 
28 Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 643. 
29 Brierly, Some Implications o.fthe Pact o.f Paris, 10 Brit. Y.B. Int'J. L. 208, 210 
(1929); Wright, The Meaning o.fthe Pact o.f Paris, 27 Am. J. Int'l. L. 39, 61 (1933). 
300.fficial Documents: Great Britain-United States, Exchange o.f Naval all({ Air 
Bases for Ot•er-Age Destroyers, 34 Am. J. Int'J. L. Supp. 184 (1940). 
31 Act of Mar. 11, 1941, ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31. 
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even a little to realize mankind's hope for enduring 
peace.32 
3. The United Nations Charter. 
The development of the general rule prohibiting resort to armed 
force except for individual or collective self-defense or other com-
munity approved objectives was a fundamental step in implement-
ing the policy of maintaining public order. The second fundamental 
step, at least in terms of formal authority, was the creation of the 
system of the United Nations Charter for centralized decision-
making as to the lawfulness of the use of force, and for community 
coordination in the employment of the use of force and other 
strategies to maintain international peace and security. 
Unquestionably, the United Nations, when acting, inter alia, 
under Articles 39,33 25,34 and 2(5)35 of the Charter, would have the 
authoritative competence to determine which states are to give as-
sistance, and what forms of assistance are to be used to maintain 
international peace and security.36 Further, under Article 53, the 
Security Council could call upon regional organizations to implement 
United Nations policies, and in turn to use regional charter authori-
zations. Under the Charter arrangement, then, members are free to 
refrain from participating in community action against an agressor 
only to the extent permitted by the Security Council. 37 Article 2(5) 
32Statement of U.S. Attorney General to the Senate Committee ou Fureigu Rela-
tions in Support of the Lend Lease Act, S. Rep. No. 45, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 
(1941). See Tucker, supra note 2, at 169 n.10; McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 
1, at 425. 
33This article establishes the decisional power of the United Nations Security 
Council. 
34 ln this article the member states of the United Nations commit themseh·es to 
accept and carry out Security Council decisions. 
35 This article obliges member states to give the United Nations "'every assist-
ance" in actions taken under the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to 
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement 
action. 
36 Greenspan, supra note 2, at 522. 
37 Id .; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 647. 
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reinforces what already should be viewed as the duty under custom-
ary law to refrain from giving assistance to the aggressor. 
The recent and continuing problem, primarily due to the global 
power competition of the United States and the Soviet Union, 
joined now by the People's Republic of China, has been that this 
system of centralized community characterization, direction and 
coordination of effort has failed to function. Fault for this failure 
does not rest entirely on the shoulders of the more powerful states. 
All states generally have been reluctant to commit military forces or 
other resources to support community action unless their intersts 
are most directly and immediately seen to be adversely affected if 
action is not taken. 38 The result is that even when the Security 
Council does act, the usual outcome is a recommendation to States, 
leaving to each state the discretion to support the community effort. 
(This is necessarily the result also under the solely recommending 
authority of the General Assembly.) 
Thus, the outcome is now similar to that under the League of 
Nations, with at most a duty of passive discrimination, i.e., nonas-
sistance to an unlawful belligerent, if so characterized by United 
Nations action. 39 Absent an ad hoc concurrence of interests of thl' 
permanent members of the Security Council, sufficient to allow a 
controlling decision under Article 39, which in the foreseeable fu-
ture will be a rare event, states will continue to be under no duty of 
affirmative partiality, to provide assistance on a discriminatory 
basis to states engaged in armed conflict in support of international 
peace and security. They will be free to be impartial toward all bel-
ligerents, or to choose on the basis of individual characterization to 
discriminate against the side viewed as the aggressor. State prac-
tice in the Charter period indicates that many member states have 
elected to continue as impartial neutrals in armed conflicts, e.g., the 
Arab-Israeli Wars. 40 This has been the case even where there has 
been a community determination of aggression, but no obligatory 
call to action. During the United Nations involvement in Korea, 
many members adopted a position of impartial neutrality. 41 
------------------------------------------------------
38 See discussion and authorities cited in Williams, /ulcrrJot•erutlll'lllal ,\ll!tlcll'lf 
Forces aud World Public- Order ch. 6 (1971). 
39 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note I, at 430. 
40 Norton, Bel!l'eeu !he ldeologJI n11d !he Realil!f: Thl' Shnclow of !he lAIII' 1!1 s,.,. 
lralil!/, 17 Har. Int'l. L. J. 249, 257-261 (1976). 
41 Greenspan, supra note 2, at 525-26; Norton, supra note 40, at 265-H7. 
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That our advocated community policy of widest assumption of 
necessary responsibility for maintaining world public order has 
been, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, most un-
satisfactorily implemented, seems a commonplace observation. Yet 
we must constantly reiterate to authoritative decision-makers, 
primarily the principal national officials, that a public order system 
that leaves participation in community action to terminate unlawful 
use of force solely to the election of each member state is fraught 
with the same risks that have in this century resulted in so much 
suffering and destruction. The author urges that national officials 
recognize that ultimately the maximum preservation of human val-
ues results, first, from deterrence of unlawful force and, second, 
from its speediest termination. Eventual effective implementation 
of the community policy advocated herein calls for unflagging em-
phasis on community identifications and common interests. Needed 
are prespectives that will result in acceptance of commitments to 
participate in community action to maintain public order, and to 
place claims as to neutrality, or nonparticipation, within the 
framework of appraisal of the requirements for maintaining interna-
tional peace and security. 
B. SELECTED CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF 
BELLIGERENT-NEUTRAL RELATIONS. 
From discussion on neutrality and the claim of shared responsi-
bility to support world public order, we turn to discussion of 
selected claims arising out of belligerent-neutral relations in modern 
armed conflicts. 
1. Claims conceming neutral abstention fJ·om di1·ect militm·y aid tu 
the enemy. 
Traditionally, a belligerent's major area of concern as to a neutral's 
conduct has been whether the neutral is providing military aid to an 
opposing belligerent. The two principal specific claims concern: (a) 
providing military personnel, and (b) providing military equipment. 
a. Military personnel. 
Until the early nineteenth century, a neutral state permissibly 
could provide military personnel to either side in a conflict, as long 
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as the neutral offered the belligerents equal opportunity to bid for 
their use. 42 Many states did not maintain sufficient military forces 
for wartime needs, but instead hired mercenaries as the need arose. 
On the other hand, neutral states needed funds to maintain their 
military personnel, and occasions to keep up their military readiness 
when those states were not engaged in conflict. Thus, nondis-
criminatory provision of military forces by a neutral was permissi-
ble, since it was mutually advantageous to all. 
During the nineteenth century the rule changed, due in part to 
development of large national military forces, but also in larger part 
to the establishment of the European "balance of power." That re-
gime encouraged limiting the number of state participants in a con-
flict, as well as limiting the objectives of resort to force, to prevent 
substantial imbalance within the system. By World War I, neutral 
state provision of military forces was impermissible. 43 In World 
War II, when the Spanish Government sent the "Blue Division" 
(consisting of some volunteers, but primarily of regular Spanish 
military personnel) to serve with German forces on the Russian 
front, the Allied Powers protested and demanded the withdrawal of 
the Division. Spain did so, although some volunteers remained as a 
"Spanish Legion" under German military command. 44 
Reference to the "Spanish Legion" illustrates a distinction be-
tween "state action" and "private action" under traditional interna-
tional law. Thus, while neutral state action in sending military 
forces to aid a belligerent became impermissible, private nationals 
or residents could join a belligerent's forces as volunteers. Article 6 
of Hague Convention V45 provides, "The responsibility of a neutral 
Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier 
separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents." Un-
derlying this state-private dichotomy was the nineteenth century 
42 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 675. 
43 3 Hyde, luteruatioual Law 2231-32 (2d ed. rev. 1954); Norton, supra note 37, 
at 279. 
44 Royal Institute of International Affairs, The War and the Neutrals: Survey of 
luteruatioual Affairs, 1939-1946 at 285, 301-02 (1956); Fox, The Power of Small 
States 160, 169, 173-74 (1959). 
45 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers• and 
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540. 
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perspective of limited state control over persons, one aspect of the 
general "laissex faire concept of the relationship of citizen to state."46 
During conflicts in this century, there have been various in-
stances of private citizens joining the belligerents at times when 
their state was neutral. 47 This state-private dichotomy presents 
states with the opportunity to send military forces to aid a belliger-
ent behind the facade of "volunteerism." The most blatant case of 
state action under claim of private action is that of the People's Re-
public of China sending hundreds of thousands of organized, 
equipped, and continuously supplied military personnel to fight the 
United Nations forces in Korea, yet referring to those personnel as 
"volunteers. 48 This claim was rejected by the General Assembly in 
its determination that the People's Republic of China was an ag-
gressor in Korea. 49 Other recent instances of substantial neutral 
state involvement in raising, training, and financing military forces 
said to be volunteers have occurred. 50 Regardless of whether the 
individuals involved may wish to engage in the conflict (i.e., 
whether they have "volunteered"), the relevant point is the degree 
of neutral state assistance in facilitating their participation in the 
conflict. 
However, of more basic concern is whether the trend of decision 
in practice still honors the above-cited Article 6 of Hague Conven-
tion V which excuses the neutral state from responsibility for taking 
action to prevent its citizens or those otherwise subject to its con-
46 Norton, supra note 40, at 282; Stone, supra note 2, at 408. 
47 Examples include the Escadrille Americans in World War I, \'arious groups in 
the Spanish Civil War, the "Flying Tigers" in China in the 1930's, American vol-
unteers with Canadian and British forces in World War II before the United 
States' entry as a belligerent, and foreign \'olunteer enlistments on both sides in 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. See Norton, .~upra note 40, at 279-82. 
48 Statement of 1\lr. Wu Hsiu-Chuan, representati\'e of the People's Republic of 
China, in support of Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea, and 
Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa), 5 U.N. SCOR (527th mtg.) 
22-23, U.N. Doc. S/p. v. 527 (1950). 
49 G.A. Res. 498(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20A), U.N. Doc. A.I17751Add. 1, at 
1 (1951). See discussion in McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 465-66. 
50 See discussion of the U .S.-financed participation of se\'eral thousand Thai 
troops in Laos in the early 1970's, during the Indochina War, in Norton, supra 
note 37, at 280-81. 
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trol from joining the belligerent of their choice. With the termina-
tion of the underlying condition upon which the rule was premised, 
i.e., the quite restrictive nineteenth century view of the ambit of 
state control over the individual, state support for the rule would 
seem greatly eroded. 
Today, all governments exercise substantial control over the ac-
tivities of citizens affecting the national interest, especially in the 
area of foreign relations. National laws quite commonly forbid join-
ing the military forces of other countries, especially to engage in 
conflicts. 51 This common practice of control over citizens in areas 
affecting the public interest has already in other situations given 
rise to perspectives of increased duty of control where the state has 
reasonable notice of inimical acts that persons within its territory 
plan to take against another state, and reasonable ability to prevent 
them. Examples include international cooperation to deal with the nar-
cotics trade, counterfeiting, terrorism, and aircraft hijacking. 
One may suggest that the trend of decision has repudiated the 
"state-private" dichotomy, to the extent that a neutral state is 
under a duty to use reasonable efforts to prevent its citizens or 
others subject to its control from joining either belligerent. 52 Com-
munity policy would appear to promote this result. Traditional in-
ternational law sought to balance the interest of the belligerent in 
military effectiveness and the interest of the neutral in avoiding de-
privations in its internal or external activities due to the conflict. In 
effect, this was another illustration of the development of custom-
ary law pertaining to armed conflicts by balancing against each 
other the policies of military effectiveness and of minimal destruc-
tion of values. The object was to restrict as much as possible the 
scope of the conflict and the number of participants, and to promote 
to the greatest extent possible continued normalcy in the activities 
of neutrals. 
Although acceptable conduct of a neutral vis-a-vis either belliger-
ent might well vary in the particular conflict situation, most as-
51 Brownlie, Volunteers and the Laze of War and Neutrality, 5 Int. and Comp. 
Law Q. 570, 575-79 (1956); McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 467-68. 
52 /d.; Friedmann, The Grozcth of State Control o!'er the lndil'idual, and its El~ 
feels upon the Rules of luteruational State Responsibility, XIX Brit. )'.B. Int'l. 
L. 118, 137 (1938), contends for this outcome. We would submit that this is todny 
the trend of decision. 
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suredly the principal expectation was that a neutral would not pro-
vide direct military aid to the enemy. The neutral was to avoid 
action that altered the relative positions of power of the bellige-
rents, the military balance. Whether neutral state personnel are 
sent, or are permitted to depart to join belligerent forces, it would 
seem that some contribution to that belligerent's military position 
occurs, and in today's situation of pervasive control over the incH-
vidual's transnational movements, this should be viewed as "state 
action." In view of the great size of the standing armies maintained 
by many states, the number of such private volunteers may seem 
insignificant; but, especially in wars between the smaller, less de-
veloped states, well trained foreign military personnel may be very 
valuable to a belligerent. 
The concern of the African states about foreign military person-
nel, most recently displayed in the Angolan criminal trials of several 
mercenaries, undoubtedly is due in part to deep-seated hostilities 
felt toward former colonial states and toward Western society, gen-
erally, as well as to suspicion that non-African states are attempting 
to intervene in African affairs. However, this concern may also re-
flect the view that a relatively few foreign military experts could 
substantially alter the military balance in a conflict. 
Although not actually an exception to the rules prohibiting provi-
sion of military personnel or war material, neutral states and their 
citizens may provide humanitarian relief assistance, e.g., through 
their Red Cross Services, 53 without violating their obligations as 
neutrals. 
b. Provision Q(War Material. 
The traditional nineteenth century rule was that neutrals were 
forbidden from supplying, directly or indirectly, a belligerent with 
"war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever."54 
53 E.g., Art. 27, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of th(• 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, AuR. 12. 1949. 6 l'.S.T. 3114, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Art. 25, Geneva Convention forth(' Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked !\!embers of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217. T.I.A.S. 3363, 75 l'.N.T.S. 85. 
54 Art. 6, Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of !l:eutral 
Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 5-15; Art. 16, Havana 
Convention of Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 4 Hudson, lulcruatioual 
Legislatiou 2401 (1931). 
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Generally, also, the neutral was required to deny a belligerent the 
use of the neutral's public agencies and its financial, industrial and 
transportation facilities. 55 This requirement was seen as a vital as-
pect of the duty of impartiality. Similar to the "state-private" 
dichotomy discussed as to provision of military personnel, the neu-
tral state was not required to prevent private citizens from supply-
ing arms, other material assistance, or firearms. For example, Arti-
cle 7 of Hague Convention XIII provides, "A neutral Power is not 
bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either bellig-
erent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could 
be of use to an army or fleet."56 
As was mentioned above, in respect to the question of provision of 
military personnel, and as others have pointed out, this dichotomy 
resulted from "the particular conceptions of public order, or eco-
nomic organization and social structure"57 existing in Western 
Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century. These con-
ceptions have altered fundamentally during this century. Especially 
as to state regulation of the international movement of war mate-
riel, the trend is toward intense regulation. 58 Certainly, in those 
states where all or most international transfer of goods is handled 
by state trading organizations, any provision of material assistance 
to a belligerent would be "state action." However, in view of the 
general exercise by all states of comprehensive regulation over 
foreign trading, it may be said that state action is involved today in 
any authorization for international movement of goods. "The 
suggestion, most briefly put, is that responsibility must bear rea-
sonable relation to actual control."59 
The present trend of decision, expressed in state legislation and 
in practice during post-World War II conflicts, is for states who 
~~a Hyde, supm note 43, at 2231-32; Oppenheim, SIIJII'fl notE.' 2, at 738-46. 
~6 Note 54, supra. See also Art. 22, Havana Convention, nupJ'CI note 6,1: VII 
Hackworth, supra note 2, at 610-21; Castrim, supra note 2, at 478; StonE.', llllpi'CI 
note 2, at 389-90. 
~7 1\lcDougal and Feliciano, .~up1·a note 1, at 438; other authoritiE.>s ritE.>d .~uprcr 
note 46. 
58 Friedmann, supra note 52; Tucker, supm note 2, at 215; Norton, .~upl'a note ,IIJ, 
at 298 (citations to national legislation at n. 223). 
59 1\IcDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 443. 
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assert neutrality to prohibit transfer of war materials by their pri-
vate citizens. 60 We suggest that the developing trend of customary 
law is that a neutral state is under a duty to take all reasonable 
measures to prevent provision of materials and other a..~istance to a 
belligerent by individuals and associations under its control. 
2. Claims concerning prevention of belligaent use of neutml ten·i-
tory to further military objectives. 
Another major class of claims deals with prevention by a neutral 
of the belligerent's use of the neutral's territory to aid in achieving 
military objectives. The two principal subject matter areas covered 
by these claims are, first, transit of belligerent forces across neutral 
territory, and second, use of neutral territory for bases of operation or 
staging areas for launching operations, or supp01t areas to sustain op-
erations elsewhere. We are concerned here with activities of a bellige-
rent within land, air and maritime territory of the neutral, which an 
opposing belligerent claims the neutral must prevent. 
Community policies involved here are again, the policy of military 
effectiveness versus the policy of minimal disruption of values. The 
principle of effectiveness calls for prevention or termination of bel-
ligerent activities within neutral territory that adversely affect the 
military balance between opposing belligerents. This reduces the 
chances of involvement of neutral territory in armed attack by the 
complainant belligerent, and thus promotes minimal destruction. 
The deference to competency of the neutral to control conduct 
within its territory gives rise to expectations that the neutral will 
prevent improper belligerent use of the neutral's territory. 
a. Transit of bellige1·ent fo1-ces. 
A traditional claim dealt with transit of belligerent forces or war 
materials across neutral territory. Customary law obligated the 
neutral to prevent such belligerent activity. This was reflected in 
Article 2, Hague Convention V, 61 forbidding belligerents to move 
convoys of "munitions of war or supplies" across neutral territory, 
while Article 5 of that Convention forbade neutrals from allowing 
60 See Xorton, Sllfll'a note 40, at 298 t·l s(·q for ~ur\·ey of mu~t recent practict.-. 
61 Hague Com·ention (\') Re~pecting the Right~ and Dutil's uf X t,-Utral Powers ami 
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18. 19ll7, 36 Stat. 231U, T.S. Xu. 5411. 
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belligerents to perform such acts. The customary rule applies both 
to land and aerial transit. 
This duty generally was adhered to in World Wars I and II, 62 and 
has continued to be asserted. For example, Ceylon refused to allow 
its territory to be transited to allow Indonesia to supply Pakistan in 
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.63 The Arab League and Indonesia 
asserted this duty as a basis for denying transit facilities to the 
United Nations in the Korean War, 64 although in view of Security 
Council and General Assembly characterizations of actions by North 
Korea and the People's Republic of China as aggression, it would 
not appear accurate to refer to this as a duty in that instance. De-
nial of transit facilities to the United Nations in that case was a 
permissible exercise of the option not to assist military operations 
conducted on behalf of the community. (Note the earlier discussion 
of this option, above.) 
During the 1973 Yom Kippur War involving Israel, Egypt, and 
Syria as belligerents, various states allowed their territory to be 
used as refueling points for United States ships and planes enroute 
to Israel with military equipment, or to be used for removal of ma-
terials stored there in United States bases. 65 However, after Arab 
states protested and stated that permission for transit of war 
supplies would be considered in applying an oil embargo, most 
NATO member states and Spain terminated their permission, rely-
ing on the traditional duty of neutrality. 66 Absent authoritative 
community determineation of aggression in the Yom Kippur War, 
each state was free to determine whether it would characterize 
which side was lawfully using armed force, and whether the state 
would choose to descriminate on the basis of its characterization, or 
62 ~icDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 446-47, recited some departures from 
the rule in World War II, as does Norton in recent practice, supra note 37, at 
294-97, but neither suggests that the rule has ceased to be operative. 
63 Rousseau, Chrouiques des .faits inferuatiouaux, 70 Revue generale de Droit in· 
ternational public 129, 180 (1960), cited in Norton, supra note 40, at 294 n. 200. 
64 Schindler, Aspects conlempraius de la neutralite, 121 Hague Recueil des Cout·s 
221, 291 (1967). 
65 Norton, supra note 40, at 295, reports such acts by Portugal, Italy, and Ger· 
many, citing articles in the New York Times. 
66fd. 
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continue impartially to deny military transit either by belligerents 
or states assisting the belligerents. 
The present trend of decision regarding belligerent tranist in ter-
ritorial waters is uncertain. The trend is that during conflict a neu-
tral is not obligated to allow passage of warships under claim of 
right of innocent passage. 67 The neutral has competence to regulate 
or even prevent such passage, except in the case of straits or canals 
connecting high seas 68 ("international" straits or canals). The ques-
tion is, what passage may a neutral permit? Article 10 of Hague 
Convention XIII provides that "mere passage" of a warship or prize 
can be authorized by a neutral, while Article 5 states that the bel-
ligerent cannot use neutral ports and waters as a "base of opera-
tions."69 
It would appear that the neutral could permit passage that does 
not substantially prejudice the relative military positions of the bel-
ligerents. This would accord with the principle of military effective-
ness, while recognizing the policy of minimal destruction by allow-
ing the neutral to avoid danger of combat within its territorial wa-
ters. We must remember that the neutral was not under a duty to 
permit even "mere passage" of a war ship through its territorial 
waters. Article 10 of Hague Convention XIII provided that the neu-
tral could authorize such passage at its option. 70 Since whether a 
particular passage might or might not reasonably be viewed as 
prejudicing the position of the opposing belligerents, depending 
upon the specific situation at hand, a neutral state might prefer to 
refuse passage in any or all cases, for increased protection from the 
risks of incidental damage in the course of belligerent combat, or of 
sanctions taken by a complainant belligerent. 
The World War II case of the Altmark,71 a German naval aux-
iliary vessel passing through Nonvegian waters carrying British 
67 l\1cDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 452 and authorities cited therein. 
68 Baxter, Passage of Ships Through Intenwtional Watencays in Time o.f War, 
XXXI Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 187 (1954). 
69 Arts. 5 and 10, Hague Convention (XIII), supra note 54. 
70 /d. at art. 10. 
71 Facts are set forth in VII Hackworth, supra note 2, at 568-69. 
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prisoners of war enroute to Germany, and accompanied by Norwe-
gian military craft, points out the real possibility of dispute. British 
war vessels halted the Altmark and took off the British prisoners. 
In answer to Norwegian protests, the British response was that 
only a "normal cruise" through neutral territorial waters was per-
missible, i.e., that passage through the neutral waters had to be the 
reasonable route between two points, normally the most direct 
route, and that the Altmark had departed substantially from a rea-
sonable route in order to use the Norwegian waters as sanctuary to 
avoid British attack. 
In the future, in view of the high speed and enormous fire power 
of modern surface and subsurface naval craft, and the increased 
breadth of territorial waters, belligerent state attitudes will equate 
belligerent maritime transit with land transit as being forbidden. 
Also, neutral states probably will concur, due to increased risk of 
substantial incidental damage and of other involvement that may 
result if combat occurs in their territorial waters when the opposing 
belligerent disapproves of the neutral's permission for maritime 
transit and has little or no time otherwise to prevent the transit. 
An exception to the duty of preventing belligerent transit has al-
lowed transit for humanitarian purposes, to allow passage of the 
wounded and sick. 72 This benefits the belligerent to some extent, 
but the policy of minimal destruction of values-here, human 
life-predominates. 
Discussion of belligerent use of neutral territory for base areas 
will be followed by consideration of the nature of the duty of the 
neutral to prevent belligerent transit or use of base areas, and the 
rights of the opposing belligerent if the neutral does not prevent 
these acts. 
b. Belligerent use of neutral territory for base areas and other 
activities promoting military objectives. 
Under traditional neutrality law, a neutral was obligated to pre-
vent use of its territory by a belligerent to establish base areas 
either for logistic support of operations conducted elsewhere, or for 
positions from which to launch attacks. As to other activities, the 
72 Art. 14, Hague Convention (V), supra note 61. 
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trend of past decision was to identify certain acts as prohibited, 
rather than to take a broad functional approach by prohibiting any 
belligerent activity in neutral territory that "augments its power to 
bring harm to the enemy."73 Four aspects of this obligation have 
been selected for comment in the following discussion. 
i. Recruiting e.[forts within neutral ten·ito1·y to obtain militm·u 
manpower. 
Although the customary rule was that a neutral was not obligated 
to prevent its citizens from joining a belligerent's forces, the neutral 
was required to prevent the conduct of belligerent recruiting opera-
tions on neutral territory. 74 In modern armed conflicts which gener-
ally involve substantial numbers of military personnel, this concern 
may not be as pertinent. However, in the case of conflicts between 
states having a scarcity of personnel trained in modern military 
technology, a belligerent's recruitment of military or other skilled 
personnel in neutral territory may continue to be of substantial con-
cern to opposing belligerents. The points made in our earlier discus-
sion concerning the duty of the neutral state not to assist in provid-
ing military personnel or material would apply here to favor con-
tinuing the prohibition against belligerent recruiting operations in 
neutral territory. 
ii. Constructing and arming militm·y l'essels, ai1·cra.t1 m· other 
equipment for use by the bellige1·ent in militm·y operations. 
This is a classical area of prohibition, whether the work is carried 
out directly by the belligerent or by neutral state citizens acting as 
the belligerent's agents.75 However, the prohibition was avoided by 
the technicality of direct purchase from private sources instead of 
commissioning war equipment construction. 76 It has been noted 
above that neutral states may now be obligated to prevent such di-
rect private sales. The two present avoidance devices are (a) 
stockpiling of replacement parts purchased from a neutral or its 
73 3 Hyde, supra note 43, at 2249. 
74/d. at 2238-40; Art. 4, Hague Convention (V), supra notl' til. 
75 Art. 8, Hague Convention (XIII), supra note 54; !'lie Dougal and Feliciano, 
supra note 1, at 463. 
76 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 714. 
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citizens before the conflict, and (b) establishing commitments under 
long-term contracts. As to the first device, it appears permissible; 
as to the second, it is arguable that no reasonable distinction exists 
between sales effected after conflict occurs and continued perform-
ance under prior long-term contracts. The same policies, discussed 
earlier, that support prohibition of sales also support suspension of 
performance under these contracts once conflict begins. 
c. Use of neutral territory for communication pnrposes. 
The traditional rule provided that the belligerent could not estab-
lish land radio stations to transmit military information, and could 
not use ship radios in neutral waters except for distress signals. 77 
However, other means of communication existing at that time were 
not dealt with, such as the telegraph, land telephone, and subma-
rine cables; and use of neutral government or privately owned radio 
systems was permissible. 78 
During the two World Wars the trend of decision in practice was 
to regard neutral states as under a duty to exercise reasonable ef-
forts to regulate all communication systems in their territory to 
prevent belligerent communication of military information. 79 This 
modern trend recognizes the vital role of communication systems in 
conveying intelligence information, and in coordinating far-flung 
military forces. 
d. Use of neutral ports by belligerent war vessels. 
The traditional rule was that the neutral was under no duty either 
to prevent entry and stay of belligerent war vessels, or to permit it, 
except for distress. Therefore, the neutral could establish conditions 
for entry, and the time allowed for repairs, refueling and resup-
ply. 80 This approach obviously provided opportunity for neutral as-
sistance to the belligerents, albeit offered impartially to both sides. 
77 Art. 3, Hague Convention (V), supra note 61; Art. 5, Hague Convention (XII!), 
supra note 70; Art. 4(b), Havana Convention, supra note 54. 
78 Art. 8, Hague Convention (V), supra note 61. 
79 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 460. 
80 Tucker, supra note 2, at 240. 
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This departure from the general principle of nonassistance to 
either side by the neutral (e.g., no provision of military forces or 
military materials, and no permission for belligerent transit or base 
areas) is seemingly congruent with the concept of impartiality, since 
access to ports, and repairs, fuel, and supplies were offered equally 
to each belligerent. However, the rule is subject to challenge as 
contrary to community policies. First, in actual operation, a bellig-
erent may be able to control the seas, so that in fact only that bel-
ligerent could avail itself of the opportunity of using neutral ports, 
to the detriment of the military position of the opposing belligerent. 
Second, in the day of long-range strike capability against naval 
forces through use of aircraft, submarines and missiles, one should 
not expect that the opposing belligerent will be inclined to accept 
this detrimental use of neutral facilities any more than belligerent 
transit or base areas in neutral territory. 
Thus, the risk exists that a neutral will become involved in com-
bat activities, with increased ambit for destruction, if the tradi-
tional rule is applied in future conflicts. In modern warfare there is 
less need of neutral ports, since modern naval vessels are capable of 
longer cruises at higher speeds and have resupply ships. The impor-
tance to belligerents of open neutral ports may be reduced, but not 
to the point that access to neutral ports is seen as de mininms. The 
result may be to encourage termination of the rule of open neutral 
ports. A general rule of admission only for distress and then, in-
ternment, would appear more in keeping with those community 
policies, as discussed earlier. 
e. Nature of the duty of the neut1·al to prel,ent unlawful belliger-
ent use of neutral's territory. 
The duty of a neutral state to prevent belligerent transit or use of 
base areas, and related activities, requires it to exercise reasonable 
effort, including use of force, to prevent improper acts by a bellig-
erent, unless, perhaps, the belligerent's power is manifestly so 
overwhelming as to demonstrate futility of effort. 81 The neutral 
may fail to use reasonable preventive effort, or may be excused 
from its duty, after either reasonable but unsuccessful effort, or a 
showing of manifest futility of making the effort. 
81 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 690; Hyde, supra note 43, at 2336-44; Castren, 
supra note 2, at 440-42; Greenspan, supra note 2, at 534. 
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Regardless of the reasons, the neutral's failure to perform its 
duty authorizes the opposing belligerent to take proportionate pre-
ventive action against the unlawful belligerent activity, including 
action within neutral territory. 82 Where the neutral is excused from 
its duty to prevent the belligerent transit, conduct of the opposing 
belligerent may be viewed merely as the excercise of sanction 
against the belligerent engaging in activity in violation of the laws 
of neutrality. Further, if the belligerent engaging in the improper 
activity was the aggressor in the conflict situation, the opposing 
belligerent's now permissible use of force in neutral territory also 
would be lawful use of force in continuing self-defense83 (or pur-
suant to organized community authorization). 
If the neutral in fact invites or grants permission for preventive 
action by the opposing belligerent, the latter's action could also be 
viewed as in collective defense of the neutral's rights to protection 
against forcible intrusion into its territory by a belligerent. Where 
the neutral negligently fails to use reasonable efforts to prevent the 
unlawful belligerent transit activity in neutral territory, or indeed, 
intentionally permits it, preventive action of the opposing belliger-
ent may not only be used against the belligerent activity, but also in 
reprisal against the neutral to cause it to adhere to its duty under 
the laws of neutrality. 
One should note again the caveat discussed earlier in this paper, 
that if the neutral is supporting a belligerent engaged in collective 
or self-defense or other action pursuant to organized community au-
thorization, such partiality would be permissible and counteraction 
impermissible. This is so because the law as to impermissible use of 
force now authorizes discriminatory departure from the laws of neu-
trality. The neutral then would be asserting a neutral's right of af-
firmative discrimination to oppose aggression under the modern law 
of neutrality, while the aggressor state would be disenabled from 
asserting a breach of neutrality. 
A recent example of belligerent transit and use of base areas 
raising various issues was the use of Cambodian territory by mili-
82 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 695 n.l; Greenspan, supra note 2, at 538; Castren, 
.~upra note 2, at 462-63. 
83 Moore, Lau• aud the ludo-Chiua War 505 (1972). 
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tary forces of the People's Republic of Vietnam. 84 That belligerent 
used the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" for years for military transit and es-
tablished major base areas in Cambodia, although Cambodia had de-
clared its neutrality in the Vietnam conflict by its domestic legisla-
tion and in formal pronouncements in the international arena. 8 ti One 
readily may grant that the Cambodian Government opposed these 
belligerent activities in its territory, but that any Cambodian effort 
to prevent them would have been futile and might have resulted in 
substantial destruction in Cambodia. In any event, the case is clear 
under international law that the opposing belligerents could in sup-
port of the laws of neutrality take proportionate action in Cambodia 
against the improper belligerent activities, including aerial bombing 
(which occurred for some years) and temporary, appropriately lim-
ited, military occupation of neutral territory (the well-lrnown "Cam-
bodian incursion" of 1970). 86 
3. Belligerent claims to embargo economic intercom·se with the 
enemy. 
The next category of claims we consider concerns belligerent em-
bargo of enemy economic intercourse with neutrals. The traditional 
law of neutrality sought to preserve to the greatest extent possible 
economic intercourse between neutrals and belligerents. However, 
in this century two world wars have involved all-out economic war-
fare, with the objective of virtually halting the flow of goods from 
and to the opposing belligerents, and consequently, terminating 
their commerce with neutrals. The present trend is that a bellige-
rent state lawfully may embargo commercial relationships of the 
neutral and the enemy. 87 
84 See Stevenson, United States .\filitary Action in Cambociia: Questions uf In· 
ternational Law, 62 Dept. of State Bull. 765 (1970); Moore, Legal Dime11sious of 
the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 Am. J. lnt'l. L. 1 (1971); Norton, supra 
note 40, at 283-90. 
85 Announcement of the Royal Cambodian Government, May 23, 1965, and Com-
munique of the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 12, 1965, in [1965) 
Annuaire francais du Droit international 1077, 1082; Norton, supra note 40, at 
269. 
86 See authorities cited supra note 84. 
87 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 796-97; Stone, supra note 2, at 508-10; McDougal 
and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 478-79. 
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The only issue is the reasonableness of measures used in the con-
text of the particular conflict. The principle of minimal destruction 
calls for that appraisal. Questions of what goods to control, labeled 
"contraband," and the methods of stopping the flow of those goods, 
should be answered upon a contextual analysis: reasonableness 
under the circumstances. No a priori rules will provide the an-
swers. Here, as elsewhere, if organized community authority is 
exercised, it is paramount. 
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides that the Secu-
rity Council may decide upon "complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations." In the absence of organized community deci-
sion, the rule of proportionality must provide the guide in the proc-
ess of neutral-belligerent claim and counterclaim. We briefly con-
sider the subjects of contraband and the means of halting the flow of 
or embargoing the enemy's economic intercourse. 
a. Contraband. The traditional approach was to divide goods into 
three categories: absolute contraband (items specialized as to use in 
war); conditional contraband (items susceptible of use in war, but 
which might be used for other purposes, e.g., vehicles, engines, 
machinery); and free articles (not capable of use in war).88 Under 
the traditional rules, absolute contraband destined for enemy-
controlled territory could be seized; free articles could not. Condi-
tional contraband destined for enemy-controlled territory could be 
seized only if consigned to the enemy government or to its military 
bases. 89 Paranthetically, all enemy exports could be seized; it was 
only neutral exports to the belligerents that enjoyed any freedom of 
movement. 
The modern trend of decision has been first, that the category of 
conditional contraband has increased enormously due to the de-
velopment of military technology, and to the trend toward com-
prehensive national mobilization of resources for war effort. As re-
gards the latter aspect, expansion of conditional contraband reflects 
community acknowledgement that governments in modern armed 
conflicts exercise comprehensive control over the public and private 
88 London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, Feb. 26, 1909, in 2 
A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties of Various Countries 
1380 (Deak and Jessup eds., 1939). 
89 I d., Arts. 30-31, 33-35. 
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sectors of the economy, and allocate all resources, including food 
stuffs and other basic resources, in the manner best suited to sup-
port the war effort. Consequently, for both reasons stated above, 
the category of goods designated a priori as free articles has shrunk 
drastically. Whereas, under the 1900 Declaration of London, raw 
materials, foodstuffs and clothing were free articles, by World War 
II all were classified as conditional contraband, leaving little more 
than inconsequential luxury items as free articles. 90 
Ironically, any item that might now still be designated as a free 
article probably would be one that the opposing belligerent will not 
permit to be imported in any event, to conserve scarce foreign ex-
change! Further, the general trend during World War II and after-
ward has been for the belligerent to seize all conditional con-
traband, recognizing that the existence of comprehensive gov-
ernmental regulation of all economic resources of the state means 
that, at least potentially, all conditional contraband may be devoted 
to the war effort. 91 In actual operation, then, almost all goods of 
significance in sustaining the opposing belligerent's economy may be 
treated the same as formally designated absolute contraband. 
b. Methods of stopping the flow of goods from and to the enemy. 
One of the traditional methods of stopping the flow of contraband 
to the enemy, or the flow of enemy exports, was by visit and search 
to identify contraband and enemy identity of exports or vessels. 92 
In modern conflicts, visit and search may be highly dangerous, with 
stationary vessels an easy target for aircraft, submarines, surface 
craft, and land-based missiles. Further, with enemy property or 
property destined for enemy-controlled territory masked by com-
plex corporate and fiscal arrangements and by flags of convenience, 
determination of enemy identity or of contraband, now and in the 
future, may require lengthy investigation impossible to conduct 
during a visit and search on the high seas. Past difficulties in this 
90 See discussion in Norton, supra note 40, at 304-06; McDougal and Feliciano, 
supra note 1, at 481 ef seq. 
9 1[d., Stone, supra note 2, at 482. 
92 Stone, supra note 2, at 478-91; Tucker, supra note 2, at 336-38. 
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regard have already resulted in a trend toward diversion of vessel 
and cargo to a port for investigation. 93 The outcome is much more 
extensive interruption of all neutral trade, for the purpose of de-
termining whether seizable property is being carried. 
The second traditional method of embargoing enemy trade was 
the blockade. Traditionally, the requirement for an "effective" 
blockade94-a sufficiency of vessels committed to the blockade to 
demonstrate reasonable ability to stop the flow of enemy exports 
and halt contraband-rather than a symbolic "paper" blockade, had 
the effect of limiting the number and geographic extent of blockades. 
In the nineteenth century, an effective blockade required a substan-
tial number of scarce war vessels, which were needed for combat 
operations as well. The result was to restrict blockades to "close-in" 
blockades of the most important enemy ports or other coastal areas. 
Modern military technology has revolutionized blockade strategy 
in modern armed conflicts. On the one hand, the development of 
aircraft and missiles have made close-in blockades extremely 
dangerous; on the other hand, radar, long range aircraft and swift 
surface craft have reduced the need for a great number of ships to 
blockage a port. Further, military technology has provided mines 
and submarines, which can achieve effective "long distance" block-
ades of great areas at much less risk to the blockader. 95 However, 
the risk of indiscriminate destruction to neutral as well as opposing 
belligerent craft is much greater, even if the blockade provides as-
sistance in guiding vessels through safe sea lanes, and so forth. Again, 
the result is not only more comprehensive embargo of all trade with 
the opposing belligerent, but substantial restriction of all neutral com-
merce in the general theater of the conflict. 
The trend has been to recognize the legality of interdicting efforts 
virtually throughout the oceans, rather than merely close-in at 
enemy ports. 96 In fact, operationally, the most effective way to 
93 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 489. 
94 Arts. 2-3, London Declaration, supra note 88; Harvard Research, R(qltls aud 
Duties of Neutral Powers iu Nat•al aud Aerial War, 33 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 711 
(1939). 
95Qppenheim, supm note 2, at 791-92; Stone, supra note 2, at 508-10. 
96 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 492-97. 
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achieve regulation and minimize interference with acceptable neu-
tral shipping has been for the belligerent side exercising predomi-
nant naval power to have its officials in neutral ports provide cer-
tifications that the neutral ship is not carrying contraband 
("navicerts") or enemy exports ("certificates of origin and inter-
est"). 97 
In the future, if the particular belligerents have the military 
capacity, we may expect continued use of indiscriminate area 
methods of blockade. As to the problem of control of carriage of 
goods by aircraft and submarine, future belligerents may seek to 
prohibit entirely such neutral traffic by aircraft, because of the im-
possibility of "visit and search," unless allowed to examine the air-
craft at its point of departure. As to neutral traffic by submarines, 
adequate control would require surfacing and diversion to ports for 
inspection. In view of the great strike capability of the modern 
submarine, and its speed and evasive ability, the probabilities are 
that substantial sea areas off the coast of enemy-controlled territory 
and other critical areas would be closed to neutral submarines, or 
else entry in those areas would be permitted only if the submarine 
proceeds on the surface. 
The outcomes of the trend of decision are that, depending upon 
the particular conflict, a belligerent may lawfully halt virtually all 
neutral commerce with the opposing belligerent, and that the 
methods used to embargo economic intercourse with the enemy au-
tomatically also restrict greatly all neutral trade in the geographic 
proximity of the opposing belligerent. 
A modest suggestion, in keeping with the policy of balance of the 
objectives of military effectiveness and of minimal destruction of 
values, is that the principle of proportionality in using coercion 
should operate here, as elsewhere in the laws of war and neutrality. 
What is permissible in all future instances of conflict should not be 
judged by the situation of World Wars I and II. In situations where 
the permissible objectives for the use of force are substantially 
more limited, it should follow that the category of goods properly 
designated as contraband would be more limited, and that the 
necessary methods of interdicting neutral commercial intercourse 
97 1 Medlicott, The Ecouowic Blockadr 94-101, 343-50, 436-42 (1952); 2 u/. chs. 5 
and 15 (1959). 
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with the opposing belligerent would be more limited. This would be 
matter for analysis in the context of the particular conflict situation, 
which can change through time. It must be recognized that the past 
trend of decision provides much room for broad discretion by bel-
ligerents. 
4. Claims concerning belligerent conduct of hostile operations in 
neutral territory. 
A state chooses to be neutral in order to avoid the destructive 
outcomes of armed conflict. So long as the neutral state adheres to 
its duties as a neutral, belligerent conduct of hostile operations in 
the neutral's territory would be unlawful. As noted above, if the 
neutral fails to prevent unlawful belligerent use of its territory, the 
opposing belligerent permissibly can conduct proportionate combat 
operations in the neutral's territory to terminate that unlawful bel-
ligerent activity. Beyond this exception, the problem of protection 
of neutral territory from destructive impact in future armed con-
flicts is posed by modern military technology. 98 Except for isolated 
minor instances of accidental misdirection of military firepower, 
neutral states in the past reasonably could expect to avoid destruc-
tion from the conflict. Their interest was in avoidance. 
In future conflicts, one must acknowledge that if nuclear or bac-
teriological weapons are used, their destructive consequences may 
well be felt over wide regions, perhaps globally. Neutral states may 
suffer equally with belligerents. Missiles, nuclear and conventional, 
may go astray in neutral territory, and will be combatted by anti-
missile systems at the opportune moment regardless of whether 
that happens to be when the missile is above neutral or belligerent 
territory. Modern aerial and long range artillery bombardment in 
border areas, or modern naval conflict near neutral coasts, neces-
sarily will damage neutral territory accidently. This was the case 
even during World War II, for example, when allied bombers acci-
dently dropped bombs on the territory of Switzerland. 99 
Even if the belligerents causing this "incidental" damage to neu-
tral states provide compensation, neutral states may have less ex-
as see discussion in McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 388-90, 472-73. 
99 Royal Institute of International Affairs, supra note 44, at 224-35. 
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pectation of avoidance of destructive effects in future armed con-
flicts. Further, depending upon the intensity of damage that is suf-
fered by neutrals and upon the capability of belligerents causing the 
damage to provide compensation, there may develop a trend that 
the belligerent is not liable for damage that resulted unavoidably in 
the course of lawful, nonnegligent combat operations against the 
opposing belligerent, or that the belligerent causing damage in that 
situation is liable only to contribute compensation according to its 
capability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this impressionistic, highly selective survey of the developing 
law of neurality in modern armed conflicts, the author has em-
phasized, first, that accurate, useful analysis and appraisal of legal 
developments require a methodology entailing: (a) comprehensive 
and contextual factual analysis of the particular process of armed 
conflict and of the relations of the particular belligerents and neu-
trals; (b) a careful analysis of the trends of legal decision on claims 
concerning neutrality and of the changes in conditions upon which 
those trends are based; and (c) appraisal of those trends in light of 
advocated world community policies. 
Second, our brief survey of selected trends of decision has em-
phasized: (a) that the laws of neutrality are indeed pertinent to 
community policies concerning the maintenance of international 
peace and security and the limitation of the destructive outcomes of 
armed conflict; (b) that although the development of rules limiting 
the use of armed force in international relations and the establish-
ment of the United Nations Charter system have had major impact 
upon the traditional laws of neutrality, substantial scope exists for 
the developing law of neutrality to continue to operate; and (c) that 
modern warfare and the present world power process already have 
resulted in customary practice repudiating or modifying many of the 
traditional rules of neutrality law. 
The challenge for future legal research is both to determine de-
fmitively the present trends in the laws of neutrality, and to pro-
pose to world community decision-makers recommendations for 
change that will assure that the modern law of neutrality promotes 
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the maximum achievement of the twin goals of public order and 
mninimal destruction from armed violence. In devoting effort to this 
task, legal scholars will, indeed, be serving "the interests of hu-
manity and the ever progressive needs of civilization."1°0 
100 Preamble, Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; T.S. No. 639; .Mar· 
tens, 3 Nouveau recueil general de traites 461. 
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